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1 NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, ETHICS ADVISORY COMM., OPINION 03-04
(2003) (“NACDL”). NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, STATEMENT ON CIVILIAN ATTORNEY
PARTICIPATION AS DEFENSE COUNSEL IN MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2003) (“NIMJ”).  John
Mintz, Lawyer Criticizes Rules for Tribunals; Won’t Be Fair, Military Attorney Says, WASH.
POST, Jan. 22, 2004, at A3.  Neil A. Lewis, Lawyer Says Detainees Face Unfair System, N.Y.
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      SHOULD LAWYERS PARTICIPATE IN RIGGED SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF  THE
MILITARY COMMISSIONS*
I. Introduction
Lawyers often represent clients when the odds are long or a catastrophe likely. The facts
might be harmful, the evidence overwhelming, or the law clearly on the side of the opponent.
Still, we do the best we can. But what if the system is rigged? What if the system has the
trappings of a fair fight, but is, in fact, skewed to one side and, by design, the lawyer cannot fully
defend the client? What if the lawyer can only lend legitimacy to a process that at its core is
biased, slanted in favor of the other side, or fundamentally unfair?  Indeed what if the system is
arranged to prevent the lawyer from zealously representing the client or compromises the
lawyer’s undivided loyalty to the client? Should lawyers refuse to participate in such systems, or
should they, should we, still do the best we can? 
These questions were at the heart of a debate among civilian lawyers who considered
whether to represent the “enemy combatants” facing trial by military commissions in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.1 Most prominently, the National Association of Criminal Defense
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at A25.
2 NACDL, supra note 1, at 1.
3 See, e.g., John Lancaster & Susan Schmidt, U.S. Rethinks Strategy for Coping with
Terrorists; Policy Shift Would Favor Military Action, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at A09. 
Michael R. Gordon, After the Attacks: The Strategy; A New War and its Scale, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2001, at A1.
4 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §1541 note).
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Lawyers (NACDL) advised its members that it would be unethical to represent an accused
before the military commissions because the conditions imposed would make it impossible to
provide adequate or ethical representation.2  This paper will argue that the NACDL’s position, at
the time and under the circumstances, was the wise and preferred course of action. It was one of
those unusual moments when, despite the instinct of every lawyer to participate, to get in there
and fight, a call to boycott was better than a call to arms.
Soon after the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States, the Bush
administration surveyed the power available to the President to pursue the terrorists and the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan which harbored them. As everyone knows, the government chose
a multi-part strategy,3 but the principal response was military --an invasion of Afghanistan and a
war on international terrorism. The President sought, and Congress by Joint Resolution
authorized the President “to use all necessary means and appropriate force” against those who
committed, authorized, planned, or aided the September 11 attacks.4
Pursuant to this resolution and claiming broad Executive and Commander in Chief
authority, the administration invoked extraordinary powers to fight a war on terrorism. And,
because wars inevitably produce both casualties and prisoners, the administration had to grapple
5 Tim Gordon, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2004, at A1.  See Editorial, A Travesty of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at A24.
6 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946.
7 Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in
Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433 (2002).  George Lardner Jr., Nazi Saboteurs
Captured! FDR Orders Secret Tribunal; 1942 precedent invoked by Bush against al Qaeda,
WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2002, at W12.  Richard Willing, Legal battles of WWII underpin Bush
strategy, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2004, at 13A.
8 Military Order of November 13, 2001, “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism” § 1(e), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). (“Military
Order”).
9 Id. §§ 2(a)(1)(i)-(iii).
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with how it would handle captured Taliban fighters, terrorists, or terrorist collaborators, whether
seized in Afghanistan or elsewhere.  A small circle of Administration officials, acting swiftly,
secretly, and without consultation with Congress, decided it would use military tribunals to try
terrorists.5  But these trials would not rely on systems based on civilian criminal law,
international law, or even the Uniform Code of Military Justice.6 Instead the administration
would create its own military commission system, based on a World War II model.7 
On November 13, 2001, President Bush publicly issued an extraordinary military order
providing that any non-citizen who was a member of al Qaeda or associated with international
terrorism could be “tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals.”8 The Military Order has breathtaking scope. Any non-citizen may be detained and
tried by the military if the President has reason to believe that the person is or was a member of
al Qaeda, or engaged in or conspired to engage in or prepared to engage in acts of international
terrorism, or harbored persons who had done so—apparently at any time or in any place in the
world.9
10 Carol D. Leoning & Julie Tate, Detainee Hearings Bring New Details and Disputes,
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2004, at A1.  Details of who is being held as an enemy combatant in
Guantanamo have come out of the Combatant Status Review Panels conducted by the military to
determine whether the hundreds of persons held in prison facilities there are members of al
Qaeda, the Taliban, or are persons supporting them.  These panels are not legal proceedings, the
detainee is not entitled to a lawyer, secret information is routinely used, and the government
operates on a presumption that a person is an enemy combatant.  Id.  The panels are the
military’s answer to the Supreme Court’s rulings that persons held at Guantanamo are within the
jurisdiction of the United States and United States’ courts, Rasul v. Bush, _ U.S. _, 124 S. Ct.
2686 (2004), and that detainees are entitled to some measure of due process to establish the
legality of their continued detention, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, _ U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004)
(Hamdi, unlike the Guantanamo detainees, was an American citizen).
11 Military Order, § 1(f).
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 Lawyers for detainees report that persons currently in military custody at Guantanamo
include “people who never took up arms against the United States or were arrested thousands of
miles from Afghanistan or Iraq, Koran teachers who taught Taliban members, and professionals
who say they unknowingly gave money to charitable organizations that funded al Qaeda.”10
The President’s Order determined that, given the grave danger presented by international
terrorists, it would  not be “practicable to apply in military commissions....the principles of law
and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases.”11 Rather, the
Secretary of Defense was authorized to issue orders and regulations for the conduct of the
military commission trials. At a minimum, these orders were to provide for a “full and fair trial”
within the following parameters:  military officers would decide questions of law and fact and 
impose penalties up to and including death. Any evidence having “probative value to a
reasonable person” would be admissible, classified information would be protected, and
conviction and sentence could rest on a two-thirds vote. Attorneys would conduct the
prosecution and the defense. Convictions and sentences would be reviewed and finally decided
by the President or the Secretary of Defense, and any individual subject to a military commission
12 Id. § 7(b)(2).
13 See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); William Safire, Kangaroo Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at A17.
14 Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of
Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,374 (effective
Mar. 21, 2002) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 9) (“MCO-1”) (all of the Military Commission Orders
and Instructions are available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html).
15 Id. § 4(C)(3)(c).
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proceeding would “not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding”12 in any
court of the United States or any state, any court of a foreign nation, or any international
tribunal. 
The President’s Order provoked furious criticism among those who saw it as
unconstitutional concentration of power in the hands of the Executive and a plan to conduct 
kangaroo courts, operating in secret without judicial review.13  The debate among civilian
lawyers over whether to participate in military commission proceedings did not arise, however,
until after the contours of the commission’s operations were first spelled out in Military
Commission Orders issued by the Secretary of Defense on March 21, 2002.14  Military
Commission Order No. 1 specifically provided that an “Accused may also retain the services of
a civilian attorney....”15  From that moment, the prospect that civilian counsel could become
involved became real and open to argument.
This paper looks at the debate over civilian participation not only to argue that the
NACDL’s position against participation was fully justified, but also to lay bare the complexity of
the question and the factors that push in one direction or the other. Although the circumstances
surrounding civilian participation in the military commission trials are quite unusual, this is not
16 It should be noted, however, that the question of participation in a rigged system is not
necessarily the same as questioning participation in an unjust system of laws.  If a lawyer
participates in a rigged system, he risks lending credibility to a predetermined outcome, but
when a lawyer participates in enforcing an unjust system of laws, he risks lending credibility to
the laws themselves.  Thus, when French lawyers applied anti-Semitic laws of the Vichy regime
during World War II, arguing over such questions as whether a person with one set of Jewish
grandparents and one set of non-Jewish grandparents counted as a Jew, they were thereby
endorsing the racially discriminatory laws themselves.  The underlying laws applied in the
military commission cases are not unjust, as a system of slavery or racial or religious
discrimination is unjust.  The laws applied in the military commission cases are instead applied
in a process that is tilted to come out in favor of the government.  For an insight into the problem
of participating in a system of unjust laws, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 226-56
(1975) (enforcement of slavery laws); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE
HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996) (enforcement of anti-Semitic laws in Vichy France).
17 Although many decried the procedures as slanted and unfair, the tribunals were not
universally or thoroughly condemned.  Indeed, federal district Judge Robertson, who ordered
that Salim Ahmed Hamdan may not lawfully be tried by a military commission until his Prisoner
of War status is determined by a “competent tribunal” and until commission rules are amended
to conform to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, observed that, “In most respects, the
procedures established for the Military Commission at Guantanamo under the President’s order
define a trial forum that looks appropriate and even reassuring when seen through the lens of
American jurisprudence.”  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 166 (D.D.C. 2004).  And,
by U.S. military tribunal standards, the current commissions are far from the worst that we’ve
seen.  Consider, for example, the military commission that tried Confederate Cpt. Henry Wirz,
the mid-level manager at the notorious confederate prison camp at Andersonville.  The board of
federal officers who tried him could admit any evidence it chose, it combined investigation,
prosecution, and judgment, it made its own rules of procedure and evidence, all but one of the
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the first time that lawyers have had to face the dilemma of participation or non-participation,16
and it is useful to consider the dilemma in light of historical and even literary examples. Even in
a particular case, the question of participation may be dynamic and require revisiting depending
on whether the legal regime is static or evolving.    
II The Military Commissions-A Full and Fair Trial or a Rigged System?
Are the military commissions rigged? Are they fixed or arranged in a way to produce a
desired result, are they irregular courts in which accepted procedures are perverted and defense
counsel’s hands tied?  In a word, yes.17
members were veterans who had fought in the Civil War and all were awaiting promotions,
prosecution witnesses were well paid, it overruled essentially all of the defendant’s objections,
and it arbitrarily limited Wirz’s questioning and list of witnesses.  At one point, even Wirz’s
civilian lawyers walked out on him, whereupon “Wirz cried as he begged them not to abandon
him.”  Robert Scott Davis, An Historical Note on “The Devil’s Advocate”: O.S. Baker and the
Henry Wirz/Andersonville Military Tribunal, 10 J. S. LEGAL HISTORY 25, 32 (2002).  Eventually
O.S. Baker stepped forward for the defense although it was obvious to all that Wirz was destined
to hang, which he did.
18 MCO-1, supra note 14.
19Military Commission Instruction No. 2, Crimes and Elements for Trial by Military
Commission, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,381 (effective April 30, 2003) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 11)
(“MCI-2”).
20 Military Commission Instruction No. 5, Qualification of Civilian Defense Counsel, 68
Fed. Reg. 39,391 (effective April 30, 2003) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 14) (“MCI-5”).
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There are essentially three parts to the procedures and instructions implementing the
President’s Military Order. The first, set out in Military Commission Order No.1 (MCO No.1)
issued by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on March 21, 2002,18 establishes the procedures to be
followed by the Commissions, including how the members will be appointed, what rules of
evidence will apply, how the trial shall be conducted, and what rights shall be accorded the
accused. The second, set out in Military Commission Instruction No.2 of a set of eight
Instructions  issued by the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, William Haynes, on
April 30, 200319 sets out the crimes and the elements of the crimes that may be tried by the
military commissions. And the third, contained primarily in Military Instruction No.520 of the
eight Instructions issued on April 30, 2003, identifies the qualifications and restrictions imposed
on civilian defense counsel who participate in the commission proceedings. 
Critics of the implementing rules focused primarily on the procedures to be followed by
the commissions.  The principal objections were the lack of any civilian review, the prospect of
21 See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, With justice for some, not all?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 20, 2001, at 9; Editorial, Are Tribunal Rules Fair?, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2002, at A18.
22 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, News Briefing on Military Commissions
(March 21, 2002), reprinted in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, ANNOTATED GUIDE:
PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS Of CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES
CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 2 (2002) (“Annotated Guide”).  Department of
Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes said “full and fair trial” four times during the press
conference, while Secretary Rumsfeld preferred the terms “forthright,” “impartial,” “balanced,”
“honest,” or simply “fair.”  Also, in response to a question asking whether the commission is a
“kangaroo court,” Secretary Rumsfeld stated that he believed that the “characterization is so far
from the mark that I am shocked -- sort of.” However, some have criticized the broad use of “full
and fair” to describe the military tribunals as an “Orwellian twist.”  William Safire, Seizing
Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31.
23 Rumsfeld, supra note 22.
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using evidence kept secret from the accused and the public, and an evidentiary standard so
minimal that hearsay and other forms of unreliable evidence, including coerced statements,
would be admissible.21 These are dramatic departures from both civilian criminal law procedures
and court martial practice, and they decidedly tilt the outcome to favor the government. Yet, in
announcing the procedures the Secretary of Defense cautioned against looking at particular
provisions and thereby missing the overall process which, he promised, would be a “full and fair
trial”22 for the accused. He said:
 ...Observers may be inclined to examine each separate provision and compare it
to what they know of the federal criminal court system or the court-martial system, and
feel that they might prefer a system that they were more comfortable with. I suggest that
no one provision should be evaluated in isolation from the others. If one steps back from
examining the procedures provision by provision, and instead drops a plumb line down
through the center of them all, we believe that most people will find that taken together,
that they are fair and balanced and that justice will be served by their application.23
Yet, in following the Secretary’s advice to view the procedures holistically, the tilt in the
system becomes more apparent, not less. Here is an overview.
A. Commission Procedures
24 Lex Lasry, United States v. David Matthew Hicks: First Report of the Independent
Legal Observer For the Law Council of Australia, 2004, ¶ 48. (available at
http://www.nimj.org/documents/Lasry_Report_Final.pdf) (“the fundamental criticism of this
procedure made by, among others, the American Bar Association is one of the process not being
impartial and/or independent in that under these arrangements, the US Military is captor, jailer,
prosecutor, defender, judge of fact, judge of law and sentencer with no appeal to an impartial and
independent judicial body.”)
25 MCO-1 § 4(A)(1).
26 Id. §§ 4(A)(2)-(4).  But, note that merely being a lawyer is a low threshold.  As Lt.
Cmdr. Swift noted, the “presiding officer would not even be qualified to be civilian defense
counsel here.”  John Hendren, Military Trial Opens With a Challenge; A terrorism suspect's
lawyer questions the qualifications of most of the officers presiding over proceedings at
Guantanamo Bay, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at A11.
27 MCO-1 § 4(A)(3).  At the opening of Hamdan’s trial, none of the members of the
panel, other than the Presiding officer, were lawyers.  Hendren, supra note 26.
28 There is a more fundamental problem as well.  As Professor Ronald C. Smith, chair of
the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA observed, military tribunals will inevitably be seen as
slanted against an accused, “I think that there is the widespread view that a military tribunal, by
its nature, cannot be impartial, that military careerists will be reluctant to acquit an alleged
terrorist (too much explaining to do), and that the tribunal members will indulge in the
9
The system is arranged to be military through and through. The military is the captor, the
jailer, the prosecutor, the defender, the judge of the facts and the law, the sentencer, and there is
no outside, impartial review.24  Military commission members are named by the Appointing
Authority, a military officer who oversees the process and who is named by, and acts for the
Secretary of Defense and the President.25  A military commission can have 3-7 members, and
only the Presiding Officer must be a lawyer.26  The other members need only be officers who are
“competent to perform their duties.”27  The members decide the facts and the law, creating the
real possibility that the non-lawyer members will defer to the opinions of the Presiding Officer
and, as non-lawyers, not have a full appreciation of the dangers of such things as hearsay
evidence and an accused’s need to confront the evidence and witnesses against him.28
presumption of administrative regularity while giving lip service to the presumption of
innocence.”  Ronald C. Smith, The First Thing We Do, Let’s Kill All the Terrorists, CRIM.
JUSTICE 1 (Winter 2002).
29 Apparently the Defense Department had to approve of any person selected to serve as
military defense counsel (a practice contrary to the procedures of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice).  See Jonathan Mahler, Commander Swift Objects, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 6, at 42.
30 MCO-1 § 6(D)(1).  One of the four persons formally charged in the first military
commission hearing, Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al Bahlul, told the members of his tribunal
that he wanted to represent himself.  The Presiding Officer told him that this was not permitted
under the rules.  Bahlul declared that he will not participate in the trial unless he can represent
himself or have a Yemeni attorney.  Bahlul has two military-appointed attorneys, but it is unclear
how his defense will proceed if he refuses to cooperate.  Scott Higham, Detainee Tells Hearing
He Was Member of Al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at A3.
31 The Commission rules do not speak to this point as such. They do, however, permit the
introduction of any evidence that has probative value to a reasonable person, see infra text
accompanying note 32. In the pending, but temporarily suspended commission proceedings,
defense counsel have filed motions to exclude involuntary defense statements and statements
secured by torture.  (The motions are available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissions_motions.html).
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The accused is granted certain protections. Yet these, too, are qualified. The accused is
entitled to notice of the charges against him and may only be convicted on a reasonable doubt
standard. He is assigned a military defense lawyer29 (whether he wants one or not)30 and may
retain civilian defense counsel, but the government will not pay for a civilian attorney. The
accused enjoys a privilege against self incrimination, but this applies at the military trial and may
not attach to prior statements of the accused even if obtained involuntarily or by means of
torture.31 The commission proceedings will be open unless the Presiding Officer decides to close
them in the interests of national security or the protection of participants. Discovery is available, 
and the prosecution must provide its trial evidence and exculpatory information to the defense,
but access to witnesses and other evidence may be limited due to national security considerations
and the protection of classified information. Finally, certain resources, such as interpreters and
32 Military Order § 4(c)(3).
33 MCO-1 § 6(D)(5)(a).
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working space, will be made available to the accused, but only as deemed necessary by the
Presiding Officer and the Appointing Authority. 
As for rules of evidence, the basic standard for admissibility remains as first framed by
the President’s Military Order, that is, “Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the
Presiding Officer [or the Members, by majority vote] the evidence would have probative value to
a reasonable person.”32 While such a standard is similar to rules of evidence in administrative
proceedings, commonly recognized bases for excluding probative evidence in civilian criminal
courts are apparently not applicable. These would include grounds such as hearsay, privileged
communications, evidence causing undue prejudice, or prior bad acts. And, apparently,
statements obtained involuntarily from either the accused or other persons may also be
admissible. 
The most controversial evidentiary provisions are those dealing with “Protected
Information” and the protection of witnesses. Protected Information covers a broad array of
potential evidence including classified or classifiable information, information which might
endanger the physical safety of the participants, information concerning intelligence and law
enforcement sources, methods, or activities, and the dramatically broad catchall category,
“information concerning other national security interests.”33  The Presiding Officer may hear and
decide ex parte, and in camera, arguments that a witness’ safety or the protection of information
requires special arrangements such as testimony by electronic means or the closing of
34 Id. § 6(B)(3).
35 Id. § 6(D)(5)(b).
36 Id. § 6(D)(5)(d).
37 Id. §§ 6(F), (G).
38 Military Commission Instruction No. 7, Sentencing § 3(A), 68 Fed. Reg. 39,395
(effective Apr. 30, 2003) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 16) (“MCI-7”).
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proceedings.34  The  Presiding Officer can delete or substitute summaries for Protected
Information, and can withhold Protected Information from the Accused, military defense
counsel, and civilian defense counsel.35  Protected Information may be used as evidence against
the accused if disclosed to the military defense counsel, but counsel may not disclose the
information to the accused or to civilian defense counsel.36  In other words, a person my be
convicted on evidence he has never seen, been informed about, or confronted in court.   
An accused may be convicted on a two thirds vote of the members, except that a vote for
death requires unanimity.37  The Members are given wide latitude in sentencing, and no
particular sentences are prescribed and no ranges provided. Commission Members are advised to
keep in mind general sentencing goals such as punishment, incapacitation, and deterrence, and,
in addition, are specifically told that: “All sentences should, however, be grounded in the
recognition that military commissions are a function of the President’s war-fighting role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and of the broad deterrent impact
associated with a sentence’s effect on adherence to the laws and customs of war in general.”38
No clarification is given, but the language sounds like an invitation to be severe.
Pretrial detention will not count toward an accused’s sentence, a period now running past
three years for most detainees at Guantanamo. And, in any event, if an accused is found not
39 Defense Officials have said that if a detainee were judged to remain a danger, even
after he had served a sentence, he might still not be released.  Indeed, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales, then White House Counsel, stated that detainees could be held indefinitely, “and they
need not be guilty of anything.”  Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Charges Two at Guantanamo with
Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1 (emphasis added).
40 MCI-2 § 6(A).
41 Id. § 6(B).
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guilty, he will not, on that account alone, be released from custody.39  Any appeals, of conviction
or sentence, are through the chain of military command, ending at the President’s desk. There is
no civilian judicial review. 
B. Crimes Triable By Military Commissions
The specification of offenses and defenses triable in military commissions also reveals a
system tilted toward findings of guilt. Military Commission Instruction No.2 sets out numerous
crimes that are either “War Crimes,”40 such as attacking civilians, or “Other Offenses triable by
Military Commission,”41 such as hijacking or terrorism. Many of these crimes, such as aiding the
enemy, aiding and abetting, command/superior responsibility for perpetrating or misprison, and
accessory after the fact, as well as definitions of terms such as “enemy,” are expansively drawn.
Perhaps most controversial is the broadly defined crime of conspiracy together with the
military’s narrow interpretation of who is a lawful combatant. If one is engaged in combat,
necessarily he has agreed to join with others to take lives, destroy property, or commit other acts
of belligerency. If he is a lawful combatant, he will enjoy combatant immunity from charges
inherently associated with being a member of an armed force. The United States has taken the
position that all of the persons fighting with the Taliban, associated with al Qaeda or otherwise,
either against the Northern Alliance or the United States after its invasion of Afghanistan, and all
42 David Hicks has been charged with conspiracy, attempted murder by an unprivileged
belligerent, and aiding the enemy (charge sheets at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2004/charge_sheets.htm).  Hamdan, al Bahlul, and al Qosi
have each been charged solely for conspiracy.  Ali Hamza al Bahlul is a Yemeni who traveled to
Afghanistan in 1999 to join al Qaeda.  He worked in the al Qaeda media office making videos
and recruiting materials and served as a bodyguard to Osama bin Laden.  He was captured in
Afghanistan in November, 2001.  Sudanese national Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi is
alleged to have been al Qaeda’s deputy chief financial officer in the early 1990's and a
bodyguard of bin Laden.  Australian David Hicks allegedly received training at al Qaeda camps
and fought with the Taliban before being captured in Afghanistan in December, 2001.  Yemeni
Salim Ahmed Hamdan is alleged to have been a bodyguard and personal driver for bin Laden
from 1996 until his capture in November, 2001.  Hamdan’s lawyer has decried the sweeping
conspiracy net thrown around anyone the government claims aided the Taliban or al Qaeda,
saying, “Had conspiracy been used this loosely in Nuremberg, you could have imprisoned all of
Germany.”  Vanessa Blum, Combatants To Go Before Military Panel, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23,
2004, at 1.
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persons who aided or assisted al Qaeda or the Taliban are unlawful combatants. Moreover,
according to the government’s indictments, one can apparently be guilty of conspiracy to
commit terrorism simply by having furnished any assistance to al Qaeda whether or not it was
related to terrorist or military activities. Not surprisingly, all of the individuals currently charged
under the military commission scheme have been charged with conspiracy.42  
C. Limitations Imposed on Civilian Defense Counsel
It is not only the military commission procedures or the broad definitions of criminal
conduct that have raised questions about whether civilian defense counsel should participate in
military commission cases. It is also, and perhaps more so, the specific limitations placed on
counsel. One might be faced with a rigged system yet still have wide latitude to defend
zealously. But what if the system was steered toward conviction and the rules applied to defense
counsel seriously hampered her ability to defend? Such is the case with the military
commissions. The question becomes, even apart from the way the commission procedures are
43 Military Commission Instruction No. 5, Qualifications of Civilian Defense Counsel
was issued on April 30, 2003 and was the centerpiece of the debate around representation.  It
was subsequently modified to ease some of the restrictions, but the essential structure remains
the same, see infra Part V.
44 MCI-5 § 3(A)(1). 
45 Id. § 3(A)(2).
46 Id. § 3(A)(2)(e).
47 MCI-5, Annex B § II(B).
48 Id.§ II(E).
15
constructed, and especially because they are constructed as they are, do the rules governing the
qualifications and limitations on defense counsel insure that counsel will be ineffective?
The rules, as first issued on April 30, 2003,43 provided that, in order to serve as a civilian
defense counsel, a person must submit an application to the Chief Defense Counsel, the military
officer in charge of overseeing the defense functions of the  military commissions.44  The
applicant had to be a United States citizen, admitted in good standing to practice law, and in
possession of a security clearance at the Secret level or higher, or the willingness to undergo a
security check to obtain one.45  The applicant also had to sign, without alteration of any kind, an
“Affidavit and Agreement by Civilian Defense Counsel.”46  This document binds the attorney to
some fairly non-controversial obligations such as notifying the government of changes in one’s
application information, being well-prepared, and representing one’s client zealously.47  It also
includes, however, some highly unusual obligations materially affecting counsel’s working
conditions, ability to travel and communicate, and relationship with the client.48 
Altogether the undertakings envisioned civilian defense counsel effectively parachuting
into a closely controlled military environment. Counsel, acknowledging that the government
49 Id. §§ II(B)-(C).
50 Id. § II(C).
51 Military Commission Instruction No. 4,  Responsibilities of the Chief Defense
Counsel, Detailed Defense Counsel, and Civilian Defense Counsel § 5(A), 68 Fed. Reg. 39,389
(effective Apr. 30, 2003) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 13) (“MCI-4”).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991). See also Michael J. Davidson, The Joint Defense Doctrine: Getting
Your Story Straight in the Mother of All Legal Minefields, 1997 ARMY LAW. 17 (1997).
53 MCI-5 Annex B.
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would not be responsible for any of his fees or costs, would agree that the commission case
would be his “primary duty” and that no delays would be sought for personal or professional
reasons.49  He would work only with a Defense team consisting of the military defense counsel
and other personnel provided by the military.50  In other words, there would be no civilian law
clerks, support staff, consulting attorneys, joint defense agreements, or any other outside help. In
fact, with respect to joint defense agreements, Military Commission Instruction No. 4
specifically banned any agreements with other detainees, other counsel, or anyone “that might
cause [civilian defense counsel] or the client he represents to incur an obligation of
confidentiality”51 with others. In apparently eliminating joint defense agreements, the rules
barred a common, strategically important, and legally recognized52 defense maneuver, and
introduced a substantial element of unfairness. The defense would be unable to co-ordinate a
common defense strategy with others facing charges while the military prosecutor would remain
free to co-ordinate witnesses and information at will.
Under the mandated agreement,53 the civilian lawyer would also agree not to travel from
the site of the proceedings without permission from the Presiding Officer and not to transmit any
54 MCI-4 § 5(C).
55 NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
SOURCEBOOK 121-22 (2003).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36. 
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documents from the site without prior approval. All pretrial and trial work, including any
research, would be done only at the site. Counsel would agree to follow all rules related to the
handling of classified information. In addition, and far more troubling, counsel would promise
not to share any documents “about the case” with “anyone” except those on the defense team.
And counsel would be further silenced by the agreement, applicable even after the proceedings
ended, not to make any statement, “public or private,” “regarding” any closed sessions or
classified information. Not only would counsel be forced to think about abandoning that best
selling book down the road, but, more immediately, Military Commission Instruction No.4
actually imposed a standing gag order on statements to the media. It states, “Civilian Defense
Counsel....may communicate with news media representatives regarding cases and other matters
related to military commissions only when approved by the Appointing Authority or the General
Counsel of the Defense Department.”54 At the time this Instruction was released, the Department
of Defense tried to assuage objections by suggesting that media contacts would be liberally
authorized.55
The most dramatic and condemned restrictions on civilian defense counsel, however,
were the rules affecting counsel’s relationship with the client. Under the agreement, counsel
would acknowledge that he would not have access to closed proceedings or Protected
Information, which, it should be recalled, encompasses a potentially wide variety of
information.56  Counsel would acknowledge that reasonable restrictions could be placed on the
57 Military Commission Order No. 3, Special Administrative Measures for Certain
Communications Subject to Monitoring § 4 (Feb. 5, 2004) (“MCO-3”). 
58 Id. § 4(F).
59 MCI-5 Annex B § II(J).
60 See, e.g., A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.1 (3d ed.) (Commentary).
61 Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of Attorney-Client
Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 145
(2003).  Charlie Cassidy & Cassandra Porsch, Government Monitoring of Attorney-Client
Communications in Terrorism-Related Cases: Ethical Implications for Defense Attorneys, 17
Geo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 681 (2004).  Marjorie Cohn, Looking Backward: The Evisceration of the
Attorney-Client Privilege In the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233 (2003).
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time and duration of his contacts with the accused, with military authorities judging what is
reasonable.  Most controversially, counsel would agree that his communications with the client
could be monitored for security and intelligence purposes.57  The government agreed that it
would not use any monitored information against the accused, but information that involved
facilitation of a crime or was not related to legal advice would not be protected.58  Moreover the
attorney would agree to turn over any information, including client confidences, to prevent
future crimes that the attorney believes are likely to lead to death, substantial bodily harm, or
significant impairment of national security, an undefined term.59
Obviously these undertakings can seriously intrude on the lawyer client relationship.
Ethically, the attorney is bound to advise his client of the possibility of monitoring and the
potential revelation of confidences.60 It is reasonable to expect such advice would chill a full and
free exchange between defense counsel and his client.61
If counsel signs the agreement, and remember the agreement is made a precondition for
qualifying to serve, he places himself in considerable peril should there be a breach. He may face
62 Under 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(c), as modified in October 2001, the Attorney General has
authority to implement Special Administrative Measures “for the monitoring or review of
communications between that inmate and attorneys or attorneys’ agents who are traditionally
covered by the attorney-client privilege, for the purpose of deterring future acts that could result
in death or serious bodily injury to persons, or substantial damage to property that would entail
the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons.” For a scholarly treatment, see, e.g., Podgor,
supra note 61, at 145-151. 
63 Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Sheik's U.S. Lawyer Convicted Of Aiding Terrorist
Activity, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at A01.  Although, at least one analyst has suggested that
she was convicted of “speaking gibberish to her client and the truth to the press.”  Andrew
Napolitano, No Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at A29.  
64 Stewart was required to sign an affirmation that she would not to “use [their] meetings,
correspondence, or phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third parties
(including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel Rahman.”  However, the jury found that Ms.
Stewart “frequently made gibberish comments in English to distract prison officials who were
trying to record the conversation between the sheikh and his interpreter, and that she ‘smuggled’
messages from her jailed client to his followers.”  Napolitano, supra note 63.
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criminal prosecution for false statements or even fraud. In this, counsel may face a fate similar to
that of lawyers who sign and violate agreements to comply with Special Administrative
Measures62 (“SAMS”) which limit lawyer access to certain dangerous prisoners in the custody of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons.  For example, on February 10, 2005 a jury convicted long time
criminal defense attorney Lynne Stewart of aiding a terrorist group, making false statements, and
engaging in a conspiracy to defraud the United States.63  Ms. Stewart was an attorney for Abdel
Rahman convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing plot.  To continue to represent Mr.
Rahman in prison, Ms. Stewart was required to sign affirmations that she would communicate
with Mr. Rahman only about legal matters and not convey his messages to third parties.64  Her
conviction rested on the fact that she read a statement of Mr. Rahman’s to a reporter saying the
“Sheik said he was withdrawing his support for – though not cancelling – a cease fire that the
65 Julia Preston, Civil Rights Lawyer is Convicted of Aiding Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2005, at A1.
66 MCI-5 specifically references 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Fraud and False Statements,
Statements or entries generally).
One might argue that an analogy between the agreement counsel must sign to participate
in the military commissions and the special restrictions placed on Lynne Stewart is inapt because
Ms. Stewart’s was an exceptional case. She was representing someone already serving a life
sentence for a terrorist bombing (Sheik Abdel Rahman), and the jury found she intentionally
served as a conduit of messages aimed at facilitating future violence. See Peter Marguilies, The
Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers For Clients Accused of
Terrorist Activity, 62 MD.L. REV. 173, 200-209 (2003) (seeing Stewart’s actions as beyond the
lawyer’s legitimate role and appropriately subject to criminal sanction.) Yet the point of the
Stewart case is not how bad, or not so bad her behavior was, but how broadly the government
puts defense counsel at risk with its non-disclosure agreements. Writing about the Special
Administrative Measures applied to pretrial detainees charged with terrorism offenses, Joshua
Dratel notes the many ways these restrictions hamper the attorney client relationship and the
ability of the lawyer to prepare a defense. And, as to the lawyer’s own legal vulnerability, he
notes, “The S.A.M.’s also unquestionably exert a chilling effect upon counsel. Given the nature
and scope of the proscriptions, it is doubtful that any lawyer could maintain a perfect record of
compliance. Thus, the government has maximum discretion regarding whom to prosecute, for
what, and when.  The question is wilfullness, and the government has the power to decide to
whom it wishes to afford the benefit of the doubt.” Joshua L.Dratel, Ethical Issues In Defending
A Terrorism Case: How Secrecy And Security Impair The Defense Of A Terrorism Case, 2
CARD. PUB. L., POLICY, & ETHICS J. 81, 88 (2003) (emphasis in original).
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Islamic Group had observed for three years in Egypt.”65  Indeed Military Instruction No.5
specifically warns counsel that any false statement may render him liable to criminal prosecution
and cites the false statements statute.66
III.  Should Civilian Lawyers Participate–The Debate
After the President issued his Military Order creating the commissions, followed by the
Procedures and Instructions, there was vigorous criticism from many quarters— especially from
the organized bar.  Most criticism did not, however, specifically engage the question of whether
civilian lawyers should participate in commission proceedings. Usually groups and individuals
just stated their opposition to the commission procedures or presidential authority or both.  In
March 2003, the American College of Trial Lawyers penned a very lengthy critique of the
67 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS FOR
THE TRIAL OF TERRORISTS 32 (2003) (available at
http://www.actl.com/PDFs/MilitaryCommissions.pdf).
68 A.B.A., TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 2 (2003) (“Task Force”).
69 Lawrence S. Goldman, Guantanamo: Little hope for Zealous Advocacy, CHAMPION
(Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Wash., D.C.), July 2003, 4, at 9.
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commissions and made recommendations, but also concluded by saying that members should
stand ready to assist in the commission trials.67  In April 2003, however, after the Defense
Department  issued its instructions imposing severe limitations on civilian counsel’s working
circumstances, relationship to the client, and ability to participate fully in the proceedings, the
objections by lawyers grew sharper. For example, the American Bar Association’s Task Force
on Treatment of Enemy Combatants called for changes in the restrictions placed on defense
counsel saying, “...the rules, as now drafted, do not sufficiently guarantee that CDC [civilian
defense counsel] will be able to render zealous, competent, and effective assistance of counsel to
detainees.”68 
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers took the most provocative
position. In a July 2003 column written for the Association’s magazine, the President of
NACDL, Lawrence S. Goldman, said, “In view of the extraordinary restrictions on counsel,
however, with considerable regret, we cannot advise any of our members to act as civilian
counsel at Guantanamo. The rules regulating counsel’s behavior are just too restrictive to give us
any confidence that counsel will be able to act zealously and professionally.”69  This was
followed by a NACDL Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion, unanimously endorsed by the
Board of Directors on August 2, 2003, that concluded that it would be unethical for a criminal
70 NACDL, supra note 1, at 1.
71 Id.
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defense lawyer to represent an accused before the military commissions.70  The NACDL Board
said it would not condemn any defense lawyer who undertook such representation but that, in its
view, “the conditions imposed on defense counsel before these commissions make it impossible
for counsel to provide adequate or ethical representation” and that the severe disadvantages
imposed on counsel “can only help insure unjust and unreliable convictions.”71
The NACDL Ethics Opinion repeated the association’s earlier view that the rules of the
military commissions, particularly provisions allowing secret evidence, denied the accused due
process of law. But the limits on counsel’s ability to defend were the principal target. The
opinion cited defense counsel’s inability to share information with other witnesses or lawyers or
to put on a common defense, the limitations on counsel’s ability to meet with the client, and the
monitoring of lawyer-client communications. The opinion especially condemned the
requirement that civilian lawyers sign an affidavit and agreement that they will abide by the
severe restrictions placed upon them, including an acknowledgment that conversations will be
monitored and that no appeals or challenges will be brought to civilian courts. NACDL believed
that a lawyer could not ethically agree to these terms and, moreover, that it was personally and
professionally dangerous for the lawyer to do so. As the NACDL rightly pointed out, a lawyer
who agrees to the terms of the government’s restrictions and signs the affidavit and then refuses
to abide by its terms is subject to indictment and prosecution for false statements under 18
U.S.C. §1001. The NACDL warned any lawyer who chose to participate, “It should be apparent
to all that the purpose of forcing defense counsel to sign this agreement is so violations of the
72 Id. at 15.
73 Id. at 2.  Under military commission rules, any charge can lead to a death sentence.  In
the first four cases, the government unilaterally announced that no death sentences would be
imposed.
74 NIMJ is a non-profit organization dedicated to the study of military justice issues.
(http://www.nimj.org.)  In the interests of full disclosure, the author serves on the Board of
Directors of NIMJ and participated in the organization’s internal debate about what position to
take.
75 NIMJ, supra note 1, at 1.
76 Id. at 3.
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agreement may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1001, as happened in the [Lynne] Stewart case.”72
The NACDL opinion advised any participating lawyer that he or she must, despite the serious
risks, provide a zealous and independent defense.  The NACDL added that participating lawyers 
must also be qualified to handle death penalty cases.73
The main response to the NACDL’s position came from the National Institute of Military
Justice (NIMJ).74  On July 11, 2003, NIMJ issued a statement saying that each person has to
decide on his or her own whether to participate in military commission trials.75 Yet it left no
mistake that it believed participation was the proper course. Non-participation, the NIMJ
statement continued, would be “unfortunate”... “public confidence in the administration of
justice would be ill-served by a boycott,” “[p]ublic esteem for the bar would also suffer,” and
“we recommend that attorneys . . . give serious consideration to submitting their names. The
highest service a lawyer can render in a free society is to provide quality independent
representation for those most disfavored by the government.”76
By participating, NIMJ argued, a lawyer can challenge commission procedures, suggest
changes, and make a record. Indeed counsel might even convince the military authorities that
77 Id.
78 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2003).
79 Anton-Hermann, Abraham Lincoln Argues a Pro-Slavery Case, 5 AM. J. LEG. HIST.
299 (1961).
80 David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 7 (1988) (quoting David Dudley Field).
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they need not actually apply all of the rules that permit restraints on counsel, such as attorney-
client monitoring. The NIMJ statement took the position that only  participation increases the
chances that there will be justice or improvements in the system; abstention means you are
sitting on the sidelines and “cannot increase the likelihood that they [the accused] will receive
justice or at least as much justice as might be obtained with the help of civilian counsel.”77
How should we evaluate these differing views? Who was right?       
IV. Sorting It Out
---Is There a Professional Obligation to Participate or to Refuse to Participate?
The debate over participation must begin with question whether professional rules would
require or prohibit a lawyer’s participation in the military commissions.  Under the rules of
professional responsibility, there would be no professional obligation to participate, and lawyers
would be free to boycott the proceedings whether for financial reasons, opposition to the idea of
trials by military commissions, or any other personal calculation.78 Freedom to choose one’s
clients is usually discussed in the context of lawyers having a moral aversion to the client or to
his cause. Some see representation of the morally odious or odious causes as simply a business
decision, as Abraham Lincoln did when he represented a slaveholder seeking recovery of run-
away slaves.79 Others have argued that lawyers must represent “any person who has any rights to
be asserted or defended.”80 Lawyers are admonished that one’s “personal preference…to avoid
81 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-28 (2004).
82 EC 2-26.
83 Canon 31 of The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (1908) was quite explicit: “No
lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client. He has the right to decline employment. Every lawyer upon his own responsibility
must decide what employment he will accept as counsel, what causes he will bring into Court for
plaintiffs, [and] what cases he will contest in Court for defendants….”
84 EC 2-26.
85 In the early 1980s, nearly ninety percent of the public defenders in the District of
Columbia refused to accept new work until they received pay increases (although the Supreme
Court held that the strike violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)).  In the past few years, public defenders have refused to
take on new clients until they have received higher wages in Alabama, Stephanie Hoops,
Defense lawyers protest pay freeze, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, February 17, 2002; Massachusetts,
Lawmakers OK back pay after lawyers refuse clients; Defenders of poor await bill signing,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 2003, at A1; New York, David Rohde, In Pay Dispute, Some Lawyers
For the Poor Refuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at B8; and Oregon, Michelle Roberts,
Public Defenders go on Strike, OREGONIAN, June 27, 2000, at B01.  Generally, these strikes have
been unpopular, but relatively successful.  But see Raphael Lewis & Jonathan Saltzman, SJC
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adversary alignment against judges, other lawyers, public officials, or influential members of the
community does not justify his rejection of tendered employment”81 and that, “to make legal
services fully available, a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered employment.”82 But, the
lawyer is free to judge the matter for herself, and professional standards have endorsed this view
for a very long time.83 As EC 2-26 states, “A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client….”84
The issue becomes more complicated when the bar collectively refuses representation
and appointment of counsel is necessary. Of course, it is quite unrealistic to think that lawyers,
each and every one, would refuse to represent a defendant, because, ordinarily, someone will
step forward. But it could happen. Perhaps no lawyer would want to represent Osama bin Laden
or perhaps lawyers, say public defenders, may, as a group, declare a work stoppage.85 In such a
Orders Lawyers Appointed, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2004, at A1 (“A justice of the state
Supreme Judicial Court yesterday formally ordered judges in Hampden County to appoint
private attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants with or without the lawyers’ consent
and to report them to the state Board of Bar Overseers if they refuse to take a case without a
valid excuse.”)
86 EC 2-29.
87 See supra note 30.
88 Military prosecutors, too, must comply with ethical rules and, in the context of the
military commission, they may face problems of their own.  Consider Art. 31 of the U.C.M.J.
which imposes limitations on the compulsion of self-incriminatory statements.  If an overzealous
prosecutor goes beyond the limitations imposed, he might be subject to disciplinary action by the
military (however unlikely) or the state bars in jurisdictions where he is admitted.
89 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Military Defenders For Detainees Put Tribunals on Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A1; Blum, supra note 42, at 1.  Apparently government officials
expected that the military commissions would get off to a smooth start because they expected the
first persons brought before the commission to plead guilty.  But the five military lawyers
assigned to defend the four have forcefully asserted their clients’ innocence and have denounced
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case, or even in the more prosaic example of assigning lawyers to represent indigent defendants,
a court may appoint a lawyer to represent a client. In that circumstance, professional rules
require greater justification but still provide an exit strategy for the lawyer. EC 2-29 puts it this
way: “When a lawyer is appointed by a court…to undertake representation of a person unable to
obtain counsel…he should not seek to be excused …except for compelling reasons.”86  
In the case of the military commissions, the prospect that the accused would not have any
legal representation simply does not arise. The military commission rules assign each accused a
military defense counsel. Indeed the accused has no choice; he must have such counsel.87 And
there is no reason to think that such representation will not be zealous and competent. Military
defense lawyers are governed by essentially the same ethical rules as the civilian defense bar,88
and the military defense lawyers who represent the four accused have, in fact, been vigorous and
effective under the circumstances.89  In encouraging civilian counsel to participate in the
the tribunals as unfair and rigged.  Indeed Lt. Cmdr. Charles Swift, the military lawyer
representing Salim Ahmed Hamdan, filed the first lawsuit directly challenging the legality of the
commission system.  Successful at the trial level, the matter is now on appeal to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C.Circuit. Hamdan, supra note 17.
90 NIMJ, supra note 1, at 3.
91   Task Force, supra note 68, at 2.
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commissions, NIMJ suggests that the special talents of the civilian bar are needed to add an
additional reservoir of talent and experience to achieve justice for the accused. But NIMJ makes
no claim, and there could be no claim, that justice can only be achieved if a civilian defense
counsel participates. After all, most courts martial go forward without the participation of
civilian defense counsel.  Instead the NIMJ statement cites the preamble to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct saying that lawyers should, as public citizens, “seek improvement of the
law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered
by the legal profession.”90 But this is hardly obligatory and, in any event, does not answer the
question of which action, participation or non-participation, serves to improve the law or the
administration of justice.
If obligation were to lie anywhere under the rules, it would lie in requiring civilian
lawyers to boycott the military commissions.  But, even here, there is no clear mandate. The
NACDL believed that the conditions imposed on defense counsel would make it impossible for
them to provide adequate or ethical representation. Similarly, the ABA Task Force on Treatment
of Enemy Combatants concluded that “the rules, as now drafted, do not sufficiently guarantee
that Civilian Defense Counsel will be able to render zealous, competent, and effective assistance
of counsel to detainees.”91  Professional rules do require that a lawyer represent a client
competently and zealously and that he safeguard the client’s confidences. But these rules speak
92    EC 8-2.
93   DR4-101(C)(2).
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to counsel’s preparation, diligence, and commitment, and the commission rules do not prevent
the lawyer from being zealous, prepared, skilled, or effective within the bounds of the applicable
law.  
 The problem is the applicable law. The rules of professional responsibility simply do not
tell the advocate when a system so constrains the abilities of defense counsel that he may not be
a part of it. The most direct guidance is a rule that encourages lawyers who find rules to be
unjust or unfair to “endeavor by lawful means to obtain appropriate changes in the law.”92 Not
much help there.
Even with respect to one’s professional obligation to keep client confidences, the model
disciplinary rules provide that a lawyer may reveal “Confidences or secrets when…required by
law….”93 But, again, the rules do not say when a law requiring disclosure is so destructive of the
lawyer-client relationship that an attorney’s obedience to it is unethical. At the end of the day,
the professional rules simply do not provide answers in situations where counsel is faced with a
rigged system or where the system itself prevents counsel from providing effective
representation. The professional rules assume away the problem because they assume that
counsel will practice before tribunals that are impartial, fair, and fully respectful of a vigorous
adversarial process.   
Still there is an argument to be made, and, as the NACDL anticipated, it centers on the
matter of competence. Although the lawyer’s professional obligation to serve competently
relates primarily to skill, proficiency, and preparation, one arguably acts incompetently by
working within a system that disables him from doing a competent job.  And there are several
94 Toni Locy, Tribunal lawyers say defense short on resources, USA TODAY, June 3,
2004, at 6A.  (“Scott Silliman, a Duke University law professor, says the requests are routine and
would be handled easily if the defendants faced trials by military courts-martial. But, he says, the
tribunals are new to the government's bureaucracy, which must process many of the defense's
requests. ‘So, it's a . . . bureaucratic nightmare,’ says Silliman, a former Air Force lawyer.”)  See
Mahler, supra note 29.
95 See infra Part V.
96 Apparently most of the Guantanamo detainees lack personal resources sufficient to
retain lawyers.
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ways the military commission system disables the civilian lawyer from doing a competent job.
First the rules as originally crafted forced the lawyer to work under adverse circumstances and
without essential resources. The lawyer could do research only on site, had to prepare the
defense only on site, could work only with military defense counsel or other assistants provided
by the military, and could not share documents or information about the case with anyone except
those on the defense team. As for resources, the attorney was entirely dependent on the military
to provide translators and access to the defendant and other witnesses. And, as events unfolded,
it was apparent that adequate resources were not always forthcoming.94 Obviously such
restrictions could unduly restrict counsel’s ability to prepare an effective defense, a situation
even the military authorities implicitly acknowledged as they subsequently modified some
provisions.95
Another way that the commission regime systematically undermined lawyer competence
was to make it likely that only a few lawyers, and probably not the best, would be able to
participate. Under the rules as originally written, not only would the civilian defense lawyer have
little likelihood of getting paid for his efforts,96 but he would also have to pay for the costs of
obtaining a security clearance and other costs, such as travel.  During the pendency of the
commission proceedings, he would also have to put aside all other legal work and effectively
97 Only one civilian lawyer, Mr. Joshua Dratel, currently serves as a lead defense counsel. 
Mr. Dratel (who also happens to be on the Board of Directors of the NACDL) is a highly skilled
and experienced trial attorney who has handled national security cases and possesses a security
clearance.(See Dretel, supra, note 66 (recounting his experience in a terrorism case)).  Mr. Dratel
became involved at the urging of Major Michael Mori, the military defense counsel appointed to
represent Australian David Hicks.  Military authorities were apparently keen to move the case
along (believing a guilty plea was likely) and encouraged Dratel’s involvement.  They even
permitted Mr. Dratel to sign a modified agreement and affidavit.  Mr. Hicks also has another
civilian attorney, an Australian lawyer, Stephen Kenney, who serves only in a consulting
capacity.  The third civilian attorney is Professor Neal Katyal who also serves in essentially a
consulting capacity.  Professor Katyal assumed this role to facilitate the separate habeas
challenge to the commission’s proceedings.  
98 Consider this dilemma in the context of death penalty cases in the United States.  Death
penalty cases require highly qualified lawyers because the “responsibilities are . . . uniquely
demanding, both in the knowledge that counsel must possesses and in the skills he or she must
master.”  AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003),  reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913,
923 (2003).  However, even though the stakes in a capital case are higher, the quality of the
lawyers has not matched the need.  See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The
Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994)
and James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000).
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forsake other clients, including scheduled trial matters. Not surprisingly few lawyers have
stepped forward. According to the Chief Defense Counsel William Gunn, about twenty five
lawyers have submitted applications and none are from big firms. Little else has been disclosed
about the qualifications or identities of these lawyers.  And no generalizations can be drawn
from the three civilian lawyers currently representing detainees since, in each case, the
circumstances of their involvement are highly unusual.97
A system structured so that only the least effective lawyers, or certainly not the best, can
participate or, worse, where only the minimally competent or overly compliant are available,
may be worse than having no lawyer at all. If the defendant has no lawyer at all, at least the
whole world can see that the process is adversarial in name only.98 
99 Harry “Breaker” Morant, an Australian officer serving with the Bushveldt Carbineers,
was court-martialed for the murder of civilian Boers and a German missionary during the Boer
War.  In the movie version of the incident, (which may take some poetic license) the court-
martial outcome was predetermined to achieve political ends.  The British High Command
selected Maj. Thomas to act as a defense attorney because he had no trial experience (he handled
mainly wills and land transactions).
100 See Drew L. Kershen, Breaker Morant, 22 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 107 (1997).
101  See, e.g., David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (1996); 
LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW (2003);
Lardner, supra note 7.
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Of course systems that impose personal costs on the lawyer, deprive him of needed
resources, or seem to invite only the least among us to participate do not necessarily lead to
ineffective or incompetent counsel. Sometimes, in the individual case, the lawyer can transcend
the individual obstacles or give the government more than it bargained for.  That was the case in
the instance of Major J.F. Thomas, who represented Harry “Breaker” Morant in his rigged 1902
military trial during the Boer War in South Africa.99  The resources available to the defense were
Spartan, and the government thought it had a patsy in Major Thomas.  But Thomas put up a
fierce defense and, although Morant and two others were found guilty, the lawyer exposed the
political calculations that insured the defendants would not have a fair trial.100  So, too, with the
lawyers who represented the hapless Nazi agents who landed on American soil during World
War II, apparently to commit acts of sabotage.  Their lawyers, Cols. Kenneth C. Royall and
Cassius M. Dowell who were tasked with defending these men before specially constituted
military tribunals, knew that the deck was stacked against them, but they fought doggedly to
represent the defendants.101  Royall wrote to President Roosevelt, and twice filed for habeus
corpus review, until, finally, he managed to bring the legality of the commission procedures
before the Supreme Court.  But, despite the persistent and skillful efforts of the defense, the
102 The Court released a per curiam opinion the day after oral arguments, July 31, 1942,
which effectively rubber-stamped the proceedings.  Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per
curiam).  The full opinion was released on October 29, 1942 after the saboteurs were executed. 
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
103 Mahler, supra note 29.
104 Hendren, supra note 26.  Scott Higham, Hearing open with Challenge to Tribunals:
Defense Attorneys say Military Commissions deny Due Process to Detainees, WASH. POST, Aug.
29, 2004, at A12.
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government had already electrocuted the “saboteurs” by the time the Supreme Court published
its opinion (which, in any event, rejected the defendants claims).102  
A similar demonstration of a lawyer putting up a good fight, even in the face of
substantial government-created headwinds, is Lt. Cmdr. Charles Swift, who represents Salim
Ahmed Hamdan in the military commission trials.  Although he compared the commission
proceedings to a Monty Python movie where “the Government had this wonderful suit of armor,
lance and a sword, and I had been given a sharp stick,”103 Swift has vigorously defended his
client by filing amicus briefs (in which he compared President Bush to King George III), suing    
 the United States, and challenging the proceedings at virtually every turn.104
This idea, that the individual lawyer can overcome the obstacles of a procedurally rigged
system, or at least must try to overcome the obstacles, rather than simply refuse to participate,
lay behind the comment of former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces,
Walter T. Cox III. In responding to the internal NIMJ debate over whether lawyers should
represent persons on trial before the military commissions, he said, “Civilian attorneys should be
willing to step up and give the accused the best defense that they can and make the case ‘on the
record’ of each case how that case may or may not have been properly defended under the
105 Email from William T. Cox III (July 7, 2003) (on file with author) (reprinted with the
permission of Mr. Cox).
106 The detention centers at Guantanamo Bay have been the subject of intense scrutiny
related to the treatment of prisoners. Although officials claim that detainees at Guantanamo are
treated in “a humane manner at all times,” Kathleen T. Rhem, Detainees Living in Varied
Conditions at Guantanamo, American Forces Information Service, Feb. 16, 2005 (available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2005/n02162005_2005021604.html), there have been
serious allegations of torture made by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Neil A.
Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse In Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at A1; by
FBI agents, Dan Eggen & R. Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A1; and by released detainees, Carol D.
Leonnig & Dana Priest, Detainees Accuse Female Interrogators; Pentagon Inquiry Is said to
Confirm Muslims’ Accounts of Sexual Tactics at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2005, at
A1. See also Jane Lampman, US Stand Against Torture: Firm Enough? CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 19, 2005, at 11.  One of the accused in the military commission cases, David
Hicks, has filed a detailed affidavit setting out the abuse he has suffered at the hands of military
officials, both in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay.  Affidavit of David Hicks, Rasul v. Bush,
No. 02-299 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2004), proceedings on remand, _ U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
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circumstances.”  He added, “This reminds me of a doctor who would say, ‘We have inadequate
medical facilities, so just let the patients die.’”105
These comments, however, fail to take account of the third way that the commission
rules set up lawyers to give ineffective or incompetent assistance. The rules substantially intrude
into the attorney client relationship by enlisting the lawyer’s agreement that conversations with
the client could be monitored. Because clients must be told of this possibility, they would
naturally be unwilling to share full information that would then be available to their jailers (and
possibly their tormentors).106  And the rules of the proceeding further undermine a true defense
by insuring that civilian counsel cannot see or evaluate all of the evidence used against the client
or have access to all exculpatory information. In such circumstances, the situation is more like
the doctor who says, “The government has fixed it so the patient dies, and I’m asked to be
present so it looks like he is getting full and adequate care.”  When all of the rules of the
107 At the time of this writing, the military commission authorities have issued a series of
memoranda to fill in some, but certainly not all, of these gaps, see
www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html.
108 This same make-it-up-as-you-go-along feature characterized the military commission
that tried the Nazi saboteurs.  Professor Louis Fisher criticized this approach as follows, “It was
error for Roosevelt to authorize the tribunal to ‘make such rules for the conduct of the
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commission are considered, it appears that even the most ferocious and committed defender will
be disabled from providing fully effective and competent representation.
--- A Utilitarian Calculus
The position of NIMJ was that civilian counsel should participate in the commission
proceedings because counsel would be in a position to soften or change objectionable rules and
because counsel could do some good for the accused. Analysis of both claims requires a bit of
deconstruction. First, the claim that counsel’s participation will facilitate positive changes in the
system highlights a hallmark of the commission process: it is being made up on the fly. The
President’s Military Order set out the general rules, but then left the creation of a system to the
Secretary of Defense, the General Counsel of the Defense Department, and the Appointing
Authority who oversees the operation of a particular commission. Procedures for the actual
proceedings had to be made up, crimes described, and the role of counsel spelled out. As the
commission proceedings began, there were no rules for disqualification of commission members,
no clear motion practice, no clear idea of how far defense counsel could go in discovery, no
developed rules of evidence.107  This make-it-up-as-you-go-along state of affairs both cuts in
favor and against counsel’s participation. It cuts in favor because there appears to be room for
good lawyering and arguing for rules that will soften the unfairness to the accused. It argues
against because the lawyers ought to be sure the client’s rights will be protected before the
process begins, not hope for the best as matters unfold.108 
proceedings, consistent with the powers of military commissions under the Articles of War, as it
shall deem necessary for a full and fair trial of the matters before it.’  Procedural rules need to be
agreed to before a trial begins, not after.  No confidence can be placed in rules created on the
spot, particularly when done in secret.  It would have been better for the military tribunal to
operate under the procedures set forth in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-
Martial.”  Fisher, supra 101, at 173.
109 See infra Part V .
110 Telephone interview with Joshua Dratel, Attorney for David Hicks (Dec. 12, 2004). 
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Second, the claim that counsel’s participation will result in positive changes in the
commission proceedings depends on at least three subsidiary propositions: 1) that, strategically
speaking, working within the system is more likely to effect change than making a political
statement by boycotting, 2) that changes that can or will be made are likely to be material and
significant, and 3) that any changes that are made, if short of completely eliminating the slanted
features of the system, will outweigh the legitimizing effect of counsel’s participation. The first
proposition is difficult to evaluate. At the time the NACDL discouraged its members from
participating in the commissions, the restrictions on counsel’s working environment and private
and adequate access to the accused were severe. But the military later modified some of its
restrictions and conditions.109 It is impossible to say whether the NACDL’s position caused these
changes or whether the more general criticism and condemnation did so. But the NACDL’s
action surely was a part of the impetus for change. 
At the same time, it also appears that counsel participating in the proceedings have
produced changes or, at least, clarifications in commission operations. For example, counsel for
David Hicks, Joshua Dratel, reports that he was able to negotiate changes in the affidavit civilian
defense counsel must sign.110 These changes, he reports, effectively put him in a position no
worse than he would be in if he were representing a criminal defendant in an ordinary case
111 John Hendren, Guantanamo Tribunal Loses 3 Members Due to Possible Conflicts,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A29.  But, Commander Swift has stated that he believes that the
removal of the members was a “Pyrrhic victory” because the commission simply reduced the
number of panelists (from five to three) instead of replacing them (which would have required
the prosecution to convince three of five, rather than two of three).  Id.
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involving classified documents. And, since the operating rules are being made up as matters
proceed, participating lawyers have pressed for and were successful at removing two members
of the first commission panel.111  They are also filing or planning to file various discovery
motions and motions for the exclusion of statements, all of which may make “new law” in this
start-from-scratch system. Moreover, as the NIMJ Statement noted, not all rules crafted to favor
to the government will necessarily be invoked, and presumably counsel can try to minimize
harm to the accused. For example, even though all evidence probative to a reasonable person
would permit admission of coerced statements, counsel may be able to convince the commission
not to allow such evidence. 
It appears, however, that there are features of the commission system that are
irremediably tilted and not open to significant alteration by those operating within the system.
These are the basic rules of operation prescribed by the President. Whether the rules will be
invoked to their full extent, it is still the case, and remains the case, that the accused can be
convicted on secret evidence, unreliable evidence may be admitted, access to witnesses and other
evidence is under the control of the military, military officers are the judge and jury of the
proceedings, members of the panel other than the presiding officer need not be trained in the
law, and there is no civilian review of the proceedings. It will take a political decision to alter
these rules, not good lawyering. 
So, even if counsel is able to change some rules, the core unfairness and tilt in the system
will remain. The net result may be that counsel, by trying to do some good, by taking all lawyer-  
112 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. Of Defense, Guantanamo Detainee Charged (June 10,
2004) (available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040610-0893.html).
113 But, of course, one cannot know the client’s larger interests until there is a client.  The
decision whether to participate, or to make yourself available for participation, may come before
you know who your client is or what his larger goals may be.
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like steps, filing motions, putting together some kind of defense, utilizing one’s full resources,
such as they are, will have lent legitimacy to a rigged system. The government will continue to
trumpet that it has provided a “full and fair” trial, and, in part because of counsel’s participation,
the outcome may appear genuine and valid. 
But, still, isn’t it better to do something?  Can’t the lawyer do some good for the
accused? These, too, are hard questions to answer. Although the deck is stacked against the
accused by virtue of the procedures, the limits on counsel, and the broad-based crimes and
limited defenses, it is possible that a particular accused could achieve some success in defending
himself. Moreover, success may be defined differently for each person, with politics affecting
the outcome. Take the case of David Hicks, the Australian accused of training in al Qaeda camps
and fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001.  It is lucky for Mr. Hicks that he hails from
Australia, a staunch ally of the U.S. and a non Arab country that has supported the U.S. in the
war in Iraq.  As a result, the U.S. has signaled that, should Mr. Hicks be convicted, he will be
returned to Australia to serve any sentence.112 The U.S. has also been co-operative in permitting
an Australian lawyer to participate as consulting counsel and in easing the restraints on Mr.
Hicks’ U.S. civilian counsel, Mr. Dratel. According to Mr. Dratel, Mr. Hicks wants to put up a
defense, does not want to be seen as obstreperous or obstructionist, and is aware of the
importance of public opinion in his own country. In other words, for some clients, success may
be more than just winning or losing in the courtroom.113   
114 In his book recounting years of serving as a “people’s lawyer”representing labor
unions, civil rights activists, and others, the late professor Arthur Kinoy repeatedly emphasized
that “the test of success for a people’s lawyer is not always the technical winning or losing of the
formal proceeding. Again and again, the real test was the impact of the legal activities on the
morale and understanding of the people involved in the struggle. To the degree that the legal
work helped to develop a sense of strength, an ability to fight back, it was successful.” ARTHUR
KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 57 (1983).
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Indeed, sometimes clients may regard a ‘win’ as simply putting up a good fight against a
powerful or corrupt foe.114  Or, perhaps the client has public relations goals or political goals,
and, if the lawyer can assist him in showing that the system is unfair and the public perceives the
system as unfair, that is a victory in itself. Or, the client may be looking beyond the here and
now and may want to make a record for history, a record to let those who come after judge
whether justice was done. Of course if the lawyer is to assist the client in this dimension of his
case, there has to be a public record, and there has to be free access to the court of public
opinion. There has to be free access to the media. When the NACDL issued its call for non-
participation, one of the severe restrictions on counsel included a gag order prohibiting counsel
from communicating with the media about any commission matters without permission from a
military official.  These limitations still exist although, following the public stance of the
NACDL and sharp criticism of the rules by others, the military authorities have, in practice,
allowed substantial press-counsel contact. It remains to be seen if secret evidence is used and
whether the public will ever know anything about it. 
--Chance For Correction from Above
One factor that may strongly influence a decision to participate in an unfair proceeding is
whether there is the possibility of correction from above. If independent civilian courts have
review authority and can provide relief, then defending someone, even in a thoroughly corrupted
process, is fully justified. Under that circumstance, participation in the proceeding is like driving
115 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
116 Id. at 286.
117 Death penalty cases in Texas present a similar scenario.  The Texas courts routinely
uphold death sentences and in some cases appeared to defy or ignore U.S. Supreme Court
rulings.  Fortunately, the Supreme Court has exercised its power of review to keep the Texas
39
a dirty car to the car wash. You can’t get there without getting in. Consider the case of Brown v.
Mississippi115 decided in 1936. It would be hard to imagine a case more corruptly arranged to
insure a guilty verdict. 
One Raymond Stewart was murdered on March 30, 1934. That night and the next day
sheriff’s deputies brutally beat and tortured three black men until they signed confessions
admitting to the murder. The next day, April 2nd, two county sheriffs and others were invited to
the jail to hear the defendants’ “free and voluntary confessions.”  On April 4th a grand jury
returned  indictments against the defendants for murder, and they were arraigned the same day.
There was certainly no speedy trial issue as the court appointed counsel at arraignment, and the
trial began the next morning. The trial ended the following day with convictions and death
sentences. The sole evidence against the defendants was the testimony of the sheriffs and another
person who heard the “free and voluntary” confessions of the accused. On appeal, the state
courts, fully aware of what had transpired, affirmed the convictions. At that time, at that place,
and under those circumstances, the defendants could not get and did not get a fair trial.  But they
did have the United States Supreme Court, which reversed. The so-called trial, the Court said,
was a “mere pretense” where “state authorities...contrived a conviction resting solely upon
confessions obtained by violence.” 116  In Brown, it made sense for the lawyers to participate and
to fight all of the way because they had an independent court to appeal to, a court unafflicted by
prejudgment and alert to denials of fundamental fairness.117
Courts in check.  In the past decade, the Supreme Court has had to reverse decisions in six Texas
death penalty cases, including three in 2004 alone.  Adam Liptak & Raplh Blumenthal, Death
Sentences in Texas Cases Try Supreme Court’s Patience, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2004, at A1.  See
also Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas
Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional
Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (2000); TEXAS DEFENDER, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (2000) (available at
http://www.texasdefender.org/publications.htm). 
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One of the major criticisms of the military commissions is the absence of independent
civilian review authority. Under the President’s Order, an accused’s fate will be decided
exclusively by military officers, and final review of any conviction lies with the President or the
Secretary of Defense acting at his discretion. Commission panels must consist of military
officers. Review Panels that examine the trial record and forward the matter to the  Secretary of
Defense or remand to correct errors of law must also consist of military officers. And final
determinations go to the Commander-in-Chief who, as the Prosecutor-in-Chief, began the entire
process by designating who should be tried by a military commission. And, to remove any doubt
that this is a closed system, the President’s Order provides that an accused is “not privileged to
seek any remedy” in any federal or state court or any international court. The President has
attempted to soften this insulated, all-military scheme by granting temporary military ranks to
three distinguished civilian lawyers and appointing them to the Review Panel. But, if the process
is rigged, it is unlikely that appeals to higher authority within the military commission system
itself  will correct the system. There can be no confidence that the appeals process, including the
Review Panel, will entertain questions about the legitimacy of the very system within which they
are operating. 
With the military commissions, the best way, (and, according to the commission rules,
the only way), to raise a fundamental challenge is outside of the commission system. Such a
118 Hamdan, supra note17. 
119 Telephone Interview with Neal Katyal, Professor, Georgetown University Law School
(Dec. 14, 2004).
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fundamental challenge is underway now. Professor Neal Katyal filed a habeas corpus petition on
behalf of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, one of the four military commission defendants. On November
8, 2004, Hamdan’s petition challenging the lawfulness of trying him for war crimes before the
military commissions was granted by Judge Robertson of the federal district court in
Washington, D.C.118  So it is simply not the case that the only way to challenge the legality of the
commission proceedings is to participate in them. To the contrary, the best way to challenge the
commission proceedings was to act outside of them.      
 Both of the U.S. civilian lawyers, Mr. Dratel and Professor Katyal, pressed the point that
they viewed their representation in the commission proceedings as just one venue, just one
avenue of seeking to represent their clients’ interests. Indeed Professor Katyal’s involvement in
the commission case grew out of his entirely separate representation of Mr. Hamdan in the
habeas corpus proceeding. District Judge Robertson asked Professor Katyal to assist in Mr.
Hamdan’s case in Guantanamo and thus provide him with more complete representation (and to
make lawyer-client interactions easier).119 Viewing representation of a client as a battle with
many fronts can make the decision whether to participate in commission proceedings more
palatable, but it does not enhance the argument that civilian counsel should participate in the first
instance.  
--–Personal Risks to Defense Counsel
Deciding whether to participate in rigged systems may also turn on the professional or
personal risks the lawyer faces. In law school classes, we tend to think of this in terms of the
120 For accounts of the Boston Massacre, see HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE
(1970); FREDERIC KIDDER, HISTORY OF THE BOSTON MASSACRE, MARCH 5, 1770 (2001).
121 See 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller Zobel, eds. 1965);
see also John Phillip Reid, A Lawyer Acquitted: John Adams and the Boston Massacre Trials, 18
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189 (1974).
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risks associated with representing unpopular or reviled clients. We tell stories, good and true
stories, of lawyers who have taken up hated causes or wicked men. A classic is the story of John
Adams in his defense of British troops. On March 5, 1770, British soldiers opened fire on a mob
in the streets of Boston.120  When British captain Thomas Preston and his soldiers were put on
trial, John Adams and Josiah Quincy rose to defend them. Although Adams was defending
unpopular British soldiers who killed Boston civilians, his dogged defense secured acquittals for
the troops.121  Adams’ defense made him a model for lawyers and a hero in American history.
But this is not a John Adams story. This is not a situation where the lawyer is taking on
an unpopular client and risks public censure or criticism. This is a case where the danger comes
from the government and its ability to punish lawyers who don’t hew the line, represent clients
the government doesn’t like, or, perhaps, defend too vigorously.  
We would all like to think that we will rise to the occasion and stare down danger in
defense of clients, but the reality of confronting government power can be sobering. In other
countries, crusading lawyers have been killed, jailed, stripped of citizenship, ostracized, and
booted out of jobs.  Even recently, for example, threats of criminal prosecution for “evidence
fabrication” and harassment have created new lows in the morale of Chinese defense attorneys
122 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, DEFENSE LAWYERS TURNED
DEFENDANTS: ZHANG JIANZHONG AND THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF DEFENSE LAWYERS IN
CHINA (2003).
123 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS AND ASSOCIATIONS UNDER SIEGE
IN TUNISIA (2003) (available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/tunisia031703.htm
124 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
125 “Unless we are to depart from high traditions of the bar, evil purposes of their clients
could not be imputed to these lawyers whose duty it was to represent them with fidelity and zeal. 
Yet from the very parts of the record which Judge Medina specified, it is difficult to escape the
impression that his inferences against the lawyers were colored, however unconsciously, by his
natural abhorrence for the unpatriotic and treasonable designs attributed to their Communist
leader clients.”  Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 19 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
126 Kinoy, supra note 114, at 307.
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who “are forced simply to go through the motions of serving as a trial prop.”122  In Tunisia,
human rights lawyers are subject to threats of imprisonment, harassment, and physical assault.123
But one might think that lawyers in the United States may face nothing more drastic than
social ostracism.  Think again.  For example, during the 1950s, the American Bar Association
encouraged local disciplinary action against lawyers who represented Communists.  In the
famous “Foley square” case,124 the five defense lawyers for the Communists were held in
contempt for engaging in a conspiracy to obstruct the trial and were imprisoned for their efforts. 
Although the Supreme Court upheld the contempt charge, Justices Black and Frankfurter
vigorously dissented.  In the dissenting opinions, the Justices recognized that the lawyers were
essentially condemned for guilt by representation.125  Professor Arthur Kinoy similarly was
convicted on criminal charges for using “loud and boisterous language” during his defense of
anti-war activists before the House Un-American Activities Committee (although his conviction
was later reversed on appeal).126
127 See Neil A Lewis, U.S. Terrorism Tribunals Set to Begin Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
2004, at 22.  (“One of those lawyers, Lt. Cmdr. Philip Sundel, said he accepted the job after the
Navy’s top lawyer said it would be a historic opportunity.  ‘Not historic enough, I guess,’
Commander Sundel said in an interview.  ‘I found out in June I was not selected for promotion
for the second year in a row,’ said Commander Sundel, who has a strong reputation as a trial
lawyer.  Under the military’s system that emphasizes promotion or resignation, he will leave the
service.  Asked if he believed the promotion denial was related to his representation of Ali
Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al-Buhlal of Yemen and his strong criticism of the tribunal system, he
said: ‘I have no way of knowing if it adversely impacted my situation.  It didn’t positively
impact, it seems.’”)
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The recent conviction of Lynne Stewart also serves as a chilling reminder that advocacy
for unpopular defendants can have serious consequences.  Indeed, Lt. Cmdr. Philip Sundel, who
represents al-Bahlul as a military defense lawyer was recently denied a promotion, effectively
ending his military career under the Navy’s “up or out” system.  His lost promotion might well
have come from his zealous advocacy against the commission system.127
A lawyer’s decision to participate in a system threatening personal or professional harm
depends on two factors. First the lawyer must fully inform himself and be clear eyed about the
risks he faces. Second, he must, at the outset and throughout the proceedings, search his
conscience and be sure that every strategic decision he makes is made in the best interests of the
client and not influenced by self protection. He must pursue a vigorous defense and not trim the
sails, even a little, for his own interests.  But a lawyer might be well advised not to participate at
all.
---The Lawyer’s Own Moral Imperative
Lawyers can obviously view participation in commission proceedings from sharply
different moral perspectives. On one side, some might find the interference with the attorney
client relationship is too harmful to countenance under any circumstances. A lawyer’s privilege
and duty to press a full and zealous defense on behalf of a client and protection of attorney-client
128 Dina Kaminskaya, FINAL JUDGMENT 49 (1982).  As one reviewer of her book put it,
“Ms. Kaminskaya suggests at one point that she represented dissidents out of a sense of
professional responsibility.  Undoubtedly more was involved, because a sense of professional
responsibility might also compel one to refuse to participate in a case in which the outcome was
predetermined.  Despite her protestations to the contrary, I suspect that Ms. Kaminskaya
possessed a bit of the dissident spirit herself.”  Mark H. Loewenstein, Book Review 55 U. COLO.
L. REV. 337, 339 (1984) (emphasis supplied).
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confidences are integral to the independence of the bar and, hence, to our system of justice. One
may see any encroachment on these prerogatives as reason enough to refuse to participate in
commission proceedings. In other words, the government must not be allowed the slightest
advantage lest, little by little, the lawyer’s role is compromised. Others may also view the entire
executive branch war on terror as vast and dangerous overreaching, not to be assisted in any
way. They want to oppose the President’s action and only feel comfortable doing so outside of
the apparatus set up to fight the war.
On the other side, some lawyers may choose to participate and may do so for many
different reasons. Some may choose to fight from within, either for the sake of the accused or to
defend one’s own sense of fairness and justice. An extreme example of a lawyer participating in
a rigged system in order to be part of fighting the good fight is Soviet lawyer Dina Kaminskaya. 
She represented various defendants in Soviet political trials where outcomes were dictated by the
Communist Party.  These trials included coercive interrogations, perjury, and subservience of the
judiciary to political authority.  Yet Kaminskaya felt a moral obligation to stand with the
dissidents.  She said, “the Soviet dissidents whom I defended were neither terrorists nor
extremists. They were people struggling, within the law, to induce the state to observe legitimate
human rights.... In defending them I felt that I too was in some degree taking part in that
struggle.”128
129  NIMJ, supra note 1, at 2.
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Others may choose to participate because they believe they can assist the accused,
achieve a sound result, and, in any event, think that the government is doing the best it can to
find ways to balance current dangers and protections of those put on trial. There is a hint of this
view in the NIMJ statement, which refers to the fact that “Military commissions have been used
in wartime in the past. But we now face a new use of these tribunals as part of the war on
terrorism—a struggle that pits the country against individuals and groups rather than other
nations, and does so without the prospect of a clearly defined end-date.”129 Maybe lawyers
should just stay in the game, acknowledging that the government does have special national
security concerns in a time of terror, and do one’s part to strike a new balance.
Recognizing the legitimacy of these different moral positions, both the NACDL and
NIMJ say that, in the end, each lawyer has to decide the question of participation him or herself
and that the lawyer should not face condemnation either way.
V.   What has happened
The case against the first four defendants to be tried by the military commissions has
stalled. The successful habeas petition to declare the commissions unlawful suspended the cases
just as they were about to get underway. Nevertheless there has been pretrial maneuvering and
thus some glimpse of whether the absence or presence of civilian defense counsel has mattered.
First, it is quite clear that the military defense counsel have waged a vigorous and competent
defense both in the courtroom and, so far as has been possible, in the press. The one lead civilian
defense counsel, Joshua Dratel, has also performed energetically and skillfully, but it is unlikely
that his service led to outcomes not otherwise attainable. 
130 Apparently the changes have not been significant enough for NACDL to withdraw its
recommendation against participation, which, to date, remains on the organization’s website. 
See http://www.nacdl.org.
131 Dep’t of Defense News Release, Feb. 6, 2004 (available at
www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr2004026-0331.html).  The Pentagon also announced that
it would pay the costs associated with counsel obtaining a “top secret” clearance, about $2500. 
(But not a “Secret” clearance, about $200).
132 Id.
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Second, as NIMJ predicted, the military has changed some rules, particularly those
affecting the lawyers. But these changes cannot be attributed to the fact that civilian lawyers
became involved in the proceedings. Most of the changes came before the civilians were even
active in commission cases. Rather the government appears to have been reacting to the barrage
of criticism from bar groups, law professors, the media, and others, including the NACDL and
its position that participation would be unethical. So the impetus for changes in the rules was not
civilians working on the inside but lawyers criticizing the commissions from outside. The
changes were, in any event, modest.130
In early 2004, the Defense Department relaxed various rules related to civilian defense
counsel’s preparations, working conditions, monitoring of conversations with the accused, and
travel from the site.131  Most importantly, defense counsel may now seek approval to expand
somewhat the defense team and contacts with persons who may assist the defense.  And counsel
no longer has to acknowledge that lawyer-client conversations, even if traditionally covered by
the attorney client privilege, may be subject to monitoring.  The lawyer must still acknowledge
that monitoring may occur if conversations “would facilitate criminal acts . . . or if those
communications are not related to the seeking or providing of legal advice.”132  Since the
133 John Mintz, Pentagon to Alter Military Tribunal Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at
A11.  Chief Defense Counsel William Gunn reports that, to date, there have been no notices of
monitoring. Telephone Interview with William Gunn, Chief Defense Counsel, Guantanamo
Military Commission (Dec. 14, 2004).
134 MCO-1 § 4(A)(3).
135 Military Commission Instruction No. 8, Administrative Procedures § 3(A)(2), 68 Fed.
Reg. 39,397 (effective Apr. 30, 2003) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 17) (“MCI-8”), provides: “The
Presiding Officer shall determine if it is necessary to conduct or permit questioning of members
(including the Presiding Officer) on issues of whether there is good cause for their removal. The
Presiding Officer may permit questioning in any manner he deems appropriate.”
136 Hendren, supra note 111.
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relaxation still seemed to anticipate monitoring, Pentagon officials then went further and
announced that counsel will be notified if conversations are monitored.133
Third, the lawyers in the commission proceedings have had an effect in shaping the
application of the rules as would be inevitable since the commissions are a make-it-up-as-you-
go-along system. For example, the commission rules provide that the “appointing authority may
remove members [of a commission panel] ...for good cause.”134 There is no definition of cause
and, initially, there was no reference to a challenge process by the lawyers involved. Military
Commission Instruction No.8 simply leaves the matter to the discretion of the presiding
officer.135  Nevertheless, defense lawyers mounted a vigorous challenge to panel members and
even succeeded in having two of the five members removed (though they were unsuccessful in
having the Presiding Officer disqualified).136 Civilian attorney Dratel played an active part in the
disqualification effort, but it is not known whether the defense lawyers’ aggressiveness was led
by civilian attorney Dratel or whether the military lawyers would have struck the same posture
on their own.
137 Davis, supra note 17.
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Fourth, NIMJ was also correct to suggest that commission rules might not be applied in
all of their stringency. The gag order on contact with the media is an example.  Considerable
lawyer-media contacts have occurred, although it is not known what kinds of contacts have been
discouraged or prohibited.  But this leniency has only been a matter of forbearance, and it was
promised by military authorities before civilian counsel were active. The timing shows, again,
that relaxation of rules resulted from outside criticism and not the fact that civilian lawyers
became participants.   
Fifth, events have also shown that lawyers participating in the commission proceedings,
civilian and military, may really have something to fear from the government.  Lynne Stewart
now stands convicted of violating an agreement analogous to the one civilian defense counsel
must sign.  And one of the most outspoken military defense lawyers, Lt. Cmdr. Phillip Sundel,
was denied a promotion effectively ending his military career. 
Finally, the most important legal victory against the commission proceedings has been
the habeas action to declare them unlawful–an action taken outside of the commission
proceedings themselves. 
VI. Conclusion
In some respects, the NACDL’s non-participation stance was easy. Civilian lawyers were
not faced with an accused pleading not to be abandoned as was the case when civilian lawyers
walked out on Cmdr. Wirz during the Andersonville military trial.137 All military commission
accused will have, indeed must have, military counsel. It was easy, too, in that the commission
system was arranged so that the opportunity to represent an accused was, in any event,
economically unattractive. Few lawyers, sympathetic with NACDL’s position or not, would have
138 Even in literature, defendants in rigged systems are almost always afforded lawyers,
see, e.g., HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (Atticus Finch), although not all are
especially zealous, e.g., FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1937).
50
been prepared to give up all other professional responsibilities and take on what would almost
inevitably be a pro bono case. In other respects, the NACDL position was difficult and
controversial. It forced the NACDL to go against its mission of defending those accused of
crimes and to resist the lawyer’s natural instinct to enter the fray. Yet the NACDL’s action was a
strategic and principled stance taken at the precise moment when it was likely to have the most
impact.
The President’s Military Order set out only the general framework for the operation of
the military commissions. When the NACDL acted, the Defense Department was creating the
implementing rules, but no proceedings had yet begun. Thus, there was the possibility that fierce
resistance and something as dramatic as a lawyer boycott could force the government to
abandon, or at least to amend, its approach. Moreover, the rules as they then stood, particularly
those related to the role of the civilian defense lawyer, were an unprecedented interference with
the lawyer-client relationship and a lawyer’s duty to defend competently and zealously. A
reasonable lawyer could conclude, as the NACDL did conclude, that it would be unethical to
participate under such rules. 
The NACDL may have also known a bit of history. Over many centuries, history’s
painful lesson is that lawyers who participate in rigged systems, even those doing the very best
they can, fighting skillfully and energetically, rarely, if ever, save the client. It is the flawed and
one-sided system, not the lawyer’s verve, that dictates the outcome. Indeed some of the world’s
most notoriously rigged systems had procedural safeguards, including lawyers.138  For example,
recent historical accounts of the Inquisition recognize that inquisitors were often “honest men
139 Michael Baigent, THE INQUISITION 52-55 (1999).
140 MICHAEL STUCKEY, THE HIGH COURT OF STAR CHAMBER 37 (1998). For a description
of the procedures of the Star Chamber, see Charles G. Barnes, Star Chamber Mythology, 5 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 1 (1961).
141 See Dina Kaminskaya, supra note 128. See also Robert Conquest, THE GREAT
TERROR: A REASSESSMENT (1990).
142 FRANCES HILL, A DELUSION OF SATAN: THE FULL STORY OF THE SALEM WITCH TRIALS
(1997).  PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE SALEM WITCHCRAFT TRIALS: A LEGAL HISTORY (1997).  
143 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).  Commentators have been generally critical of the
Supreme Court’s role in the Quirin case. See Fisher, supra note 101, at 173 (arguing that the
Court was “practically compelled . . . to take the case and pretend to exercise an independent
review”); Danelski, supra note 101, at 61 (calling the Court’s opinion an “agonizing effort to
justify a fait accompli”).
144 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).  Yamashita was the commanding General of the
Japanese Fourteenth Army Group in the Phillipine Islands during World War II.  He was tried
before a military commission, which the Supreme Court sanctioned, made up of five American
generals, none of whom were lawyers.  He was hanged, despite his being “rushed to trial under
an improper charge, given insufficient time to prepare an adequate defense, deprived of the
benefits of some of the most elementary rules of evidence and summarily sentenced.”  Id. at 27-
28 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  For an account of the trial, see J. Gordon Feldhaus, The Trial of
Yamashita, 15 SOUTH DAKOTA BAR JOURNAL 181 (1946).
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working painstakingly for their faith” and, in many cases, “in a scrupulously legal manner.”139
Defendants in the infamous “star chamber” in England were represented by an “energetic and
extensive group” of barristers and sergeants-at-law.140  In political “show trials” in the Soviet
Union, defendants were afforded defense counsel.141
Even in American history, there are numerous examples of rigged trials where the
defendants were provided with certain procedural protections, sometimes including zealous
lawyers, but their convictions were nonetheless predetermined. Examples include the Salem
Witch trials which resulted in 160 tried and 19 executed in a special “witchcraft court.”142  The
World War II cases of the Nazi saboteurs143 and Japanese General Yamashita144 had prearranged
145 Fisher, supra note 101.
146 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 382 (8th ed. 2004).
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outcomes; this, despite what are generally regarded as aggressive and heroic efforts of their
defense counsel.145  Indeed, while some think of the term “kangaroo court”as an Australian
invention, it actually originated during the mid-nineteenth century in the American West to
describe rigged courts that quickly bounced defendants from the gavel to the gallows.146 If
defendants are doomed in any event, maybe the best way to fight a rigged system is to call it a
charade and refuse to be a part of it.
Critics of the military commissions have equated them to the Star Chamber, kangaroo
courts, and show trials. These labels go too far. Yet despite some changes in the circumstances
of how civilian counsel may participate in the commissions, the system retains  features that are
fundamentally unfair and apparently not open to alteration. It remains the case that the accused
can be convicted on secret evidence, hearsay statements even those secured by coercion or
torture may be admitted into evidence, the accused’s own statements, even if secured by
coercion or torture, may be admitted into evidence, access to witnesses and other evidence is
under the control of the government, military officers are the judge and jury, members of a panel
other than the presiding officer need not be lawyers, and there is no civilian judicial review of
the proceedings. Civilian counsel is still hampered in gaining access to the accused and to other
witnesses and evidence. Counsel remains restricted in speaking to the media and still faces the
prospect that lawyer-client conversations will be monitored. Under such circumstances,
NACDL’s non-participation stance was and remains a fully defensible, ethical, and even wise
choice.
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